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senting himself as agent for the signer. Even if the seller's capacity as
agent is known, care should still be exercised since there is always the
possibility that he completed the instrument in excess of the authority
given.
GORDON E. NEUENSCHWANDER
Intent in Larceny by Trick in Ohio
A BUILDING CONTRACTOR who obtained money from certain indi-
viduals with their consent by fraudulently promising that he would build
houses for them was convicted of larceny by trick under Ohio General
Code Section 12447-1. In his charge to the jury, the trial judge omitted
reference to the intent of the accused to deprive the owner permanently of
his property as an essential element of the crime of larceny by trick under
the statute. The Court of Appeals found the omission reversible error, but
the Ohio Supreme Court, reversing the appellate court, held that intent to
deprive the owner permanently of his property is not an essential element
of the crime under Section 12447-1.'
The Court of Appeals had held that while Section 12447-1 does not
mention intent, it should be construed in the light of Ohio General Code
Section 12447, the general larceny section, which for a conviction, does
require the intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property. How-
ever, the Supreme Court reasoned that the larceny by trick statute would
have no real purpose were it construed merely as a supplement to the gen-
eral larceny statute and that where a statute is silent on intent, it indicates
a legislative intent that "proof of a specific intent" is unnecessary, "gen-
eral intent to do the proscribed act" being sufficient.2
Prior to the enactment of Section 12447-1,3 larceny by trick was punisha-
ble under Section 12447, the general larceny section.4 To constitute the
'State v. Healy, 156 Ohio St. 229 (1951)
2 The court did not refer to Kilbourne v. State, 84 Ohio St. 247 (1911), which held
a statute unconstitutional which defined a serious crime without requiring a criminal
intent.
3 OHio GENERAL CODE § 12447-1 was enacted September 16, 1943 and provides:
"Whoever obtains possession of, or title to, anything of value with the consent of
the person from whom he obtained it, provided he induced such consent by a false
or fraudulent representation, pretense, token, or writing is guilty of larceny by trick,
and, if the value of the thing obtained by such false or fraudulent representation,
pretense, token, or writing is thirty-five dollars or more, shall be imprisoned in the
penitentiary not less than one year nor more than seven years, or, if the value is less
than that sum, be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more
than thirty days, or both.
4 OHio GENERAL CODE § 12447 provides: "Whoever steals anything of value is
guilty of larceny " Because the statute mentions only larceny to be a crime, the
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crime of larceny by trick, the taker had to intend at the time of the taking
to deprive the owner permanently of the thing delivered, and had to induce
the owner by a fraudulent representation to part voluntarily with the pos-
session of his property, the owner intending that the thing delivered be
returned to him or disposed of under his direction.5 If the owner, induced
by and relying upon a false representation made by the taker with the
intent to defraud the owner, intended to transfer not only possession of, but
also title to, the property, the crime was false pretenses, punishable under
Ohio General Code Section 13104,6 and not larceny by trick.7 The taker,
therefore, could successfully defend a prosecution for larceny by trick by
proving that he obtained ttle to, rather than mere possession of, the prop-
erty of the owner."
In order to constitute the crime of false pretenses under Section 13104,
the representation made by the taker, unlike the representation in the crime
of larceny by trick,9 had to relate to a past or present fact; a mere representa-
tion or promise in relation to a future transaction, however fraudulent, was
not within the false pretense statute.10 Thus a taker who, with intent to
courts have resorted to the common law definition of larceny, which includes larceny
by trick. Miller v. State, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 408 (Ohio App. 1935).
'Kellogg v. State, 26 Ohio St. 15 (1875); Miller v. State, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 408
(Ohio App. 1935); Eiseman & Landsman v. State, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 145 (Ohio App.
1932).
The Ohio Supreme Court in the principal case stated that this court has
held that even where the taking is not coupled with an intention to permanently
deprive the owner of possession it is nevertheless larceny." The court cited for au-
thority Berry v. State, 31 Ohio St. 219 (1877) where a defendant took and carried
away property without the owners consent, with intent to conceal it until the owner
offered a reward. It is apparent that the defendant did intend to deprive the owner
permanently of his property unless the owner complied with a condition the de-
fendant had no right to impose. See MAY, CRMaNAL LAW § 240 (4th ed. 1938);
CLARK & MARSHALL, CRnmlNAL LAW § 327 (4th ed. 1940)
'OFno GmEmNAL CODE § 13104 provides: "Whoever, by false pretense and with
intent to defraud, obtains anything of value " Cases construing this section
are State v. Joseph, 115 Ohio St. 127, 152 N.E. 186 (1926); Griffith v. State, 93
Ohio St. 294, 112 N.E. 1017 (1915); Williams v. State, 77 Ohio St. 468, 83 N.E.
802 (1908); Earp v. State, 21 Ohio App. 417, 153 N.E. 245 (1926); Zuckerman v.
State, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 404 (1905); State v. Perrin, 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 97
(1909).
"Ile reason the taker was not guilty of larceny by trick is that" at the time of
the transaction, he does not take and carry away the goods of another person, but the
goods of himself." Kellogg v. State, 26 Ohio St. 15, 19 (1875).
'Kellogg v. State, 26 Ohio St 15 (1875); Kudla v. State, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 43 (Ohio
App. 1922).
'In larceny by trick the false representation could relate to past, present, or future
facts. Cases cited Note 5 supra.
"Harris v. State, 125 Ohio St. 257, 181 N.E. 104 (1932); Horton v. State, 85 Ohio
St. 13, P6 N.E. 797 (1911); State v. Gibbs, 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 129 (1909)
aff'd = Part, 82 Ohio St. 456, 92 N.E. 1123 (1910); Winnett v. State, 18 Ohio
1951]
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defraud, induced an owner to part with title to his property by a false
representation of a future fact could escape punishment under both the
larceny and the false pretense statutes.
Section 12447-1 makes the taker guilty of the crime of larceny by trick
if he" obtains possesston of, or ttle to, anything of value with the con-
sent of the person from whom he obtains it, provided he induces such con-
sent by a false or fraudulent representation, pretense, token, or writing "
(Italics added). Under this statute the taker cannot successfully defend a
prosecution for larceny by trick by proving that he fraudulently obtained
title to, rather than mere possession of, the property of the owner. The
abrogaton of this defense, in effect, combines into one crime the crimes
of larceny by trick and false pretenses."
The appellate court in the principal case stated that the elimination of
this defense was the apparent legislative purpose in adopting Section 12-
447-1.12
An Ohio appellate court, in the only interpretation of Section 12447-1
prior to the principal case, stated that the taker is guilty of larceny by
trick regardless of whether the false or fraudulent representation, pretense,
token or writing relates to past, present or future facts, events and transac-
tions." The court added that the legislature apparently intended the
statute to remedy the inadequacies of the older larceny and false pretense
statutes by making it a penal offense for a taker to obtain title to property
from the owner by a false representation relating to a future fact.' 4
These conclusions of the appellate courts seem sound.
It is extremely doubtful that the purpose of the General Assembly was, as
stated by the Supreme Court in the principal case, to eliminate intent to
C.C. 515 (1899), aff'd, 62 Ohio St. 650, 58 N.E. 1102 (1899); Norris v. State, 25
Ohio St. 217 (1874); Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 280 (1855); Inre False Pre-
tenses, 9 Ohio Dec. 825 (1899)
If the representation concerning a future fact was accompanied by a representa-
tion of a past or existing fact, and reliance was placed in part upon the latter, there
was sufficient representation of a present or past fact to bring the case within the
false pretense statute. Earp v. State, 21 Ohio App. 417, 153 N.E. 245 (1926);
Zuckerman v. State, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 404 (1905)
'The General Assembly, however, re-enacted § 13104, the false pretense statute,
when it enacted § 12447-1.
California, Massachusetts, and New York have abolished larceny, larceny by
trick, embezzlement and false pretenses as distinctive crimes and combined all into
single statutory offenses. CAL. PEN. CODE H§ 484 and 490 (a) (Deering 1949);
MAss. ANN. LAws c. 266, § 30 (1934); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 1290.
' State v. Healy, 58 Ohio L. Abs. 33 (Ohio App. 1950).
'State v. Singleton, 85 Ohio App. 245, 87 N.E. 2d 358 (1949) The Supreme
Court refused to review the case, but affirmed this proposition in the Heay case.
' The New York Court of Appeals refused to adopt such a construction of § 1290 of
the N.Y. PEN. LAW, declaring that the statute " was not designed to, and did
not, broaden the scope of the crime of larceny or designate as criminal that which
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deprive the victim permanently of his property as an essential element of
the crime of larceny by trick.r5
The legislature re-enacted the false pretense statute when it enacted
Section 12447-1. A taker who obtains title to the property of another with
his consent by falsely representing a past or existing fact can be indicted
under either the larceny by trick or the false pretense statute. If the taker
is indicted under the larceny by trick statute, the state need not show an
intent to deprive one permanently of his property, according to the princi-
pal case, and, if convicted, the defendant may receive a maximum sentence
of seven years in the penitentiary. If, however, the taker is indicted under
the false pretense statute, the state must show an intent to deprive the vic-
tim permanently of his property- but, if convicted, the defendant can
receive a maximum sentence of only three years.'6 Thus, a lesser wrong-
doer, indicted under the larceny by trick statute could be sentenced to im-
prisonment more than twice as long as a greater wrongdoer indicted under
the false pretense statute. Could the legislature have intended such an
odd result?
Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the General Assembly in-
tended to impose the severe punishment provided for by the larceny by
trick statute upon a person who, for example, borrows an automobile from
a friend representing that he intends to go to a drug store when he actually
intends to teach his wife how to drive, or who borrows a tea set from a
neighbor by representing that he intends to use it for one day when he
actually intends to use it for several days before returning it.
DANIEL L. E=EUmM
was previously innocent." People v. Karp, 298 N.Y. 213, 216, 81 NXE.2d 817, 817
(1948). California and Massachusetts decisions have reached the same result as
Omio GENERAL CODE § 12447-1 by holding that a present intention not to perform
in the future is a present fact People v. Mason, 86 Cal. App2.d 445, 195 P.2d 60
(1948); People v. Gordon, 71 Cal. App.2d 606, 163 P.2d 110 (1945); People v.
Ames, 61 Cal. App.2d 522, 143 P.2d 92 (1943); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 252
Mass. 116, 147 N.E. 588 (1925); Commonwealth v. Walker, 108 Mass. 309
(1871). But ef. People v. Jackson, 24 Cal. App.2d 182, 74 P.2d 1085 (1937);
Commonwealth v. Althause, 207 Mass. 32, 93 N.E. 202 (1910).
"The California, Massachusetts, and New York statutes, supra -note 10, expressly
require a specific intent on the part of the taker. The New York statute, after de-
fining larceny, provides: "Hereafter it shall be immaterial in, and no defense to a
prosecution for larceny that 1. .The accused obtained possession of, or title 5o such
property with the consent of the person from whom he obtained it, provided he in-
duced such consent by a false or fraudulent representation, pretense, token or writ-
ing; There is a marked similarity between the language of Os-io GENERAL
CODE § 12447-1 and this part of the New York statute.
"See CLARK & MA ,RHALL, CumAL LAW § 364 (4th ed. 1940)
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